Digital fingerprinting of multimedia data involves embedding information in the content, and offers protection to the digital rights of the content by allowing illegitimate usage of the content to be identified by authorized parties. One potential threat to fingerprints is collusion, whereby a group of adversaries combine their in&-vidual copies in an attempt to remove the underlying fingerprints.
INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
With the rapid deployment of multimedia technologies and the substantial growth in the use of the Intemet. digital protection of multimedia data has become increasingly critical. Digital fingerprinting is an effort to offer such protection by providing a means for authorized parties to identify fingerprints embedded in the multimedia content. There is, however, a class of cost-effective and powerful attacks, called collusion attacks, whereby a coalition of users combine their different marked copies of the same media content in an attempt to attenuatelremove the trace of any original fingerprint. The fingerprint must therefore survive both standard distortions and collusion attacks. Several methods have been proposed in the literature to embed and hide fingerprints (watermarks) in different media [2,3]. The spread spectrum watermarking method, where the watermarks have a componentwise Gaussian distribution and are statistically independent, was argued to be highly resistant to collusion attacks [3, 51.
The research on the collusion-resistant fingerprinting systems include designing collusion-resistant fingerprint codes [I, 81, and examining the resistance performance of specific watermarking schemes under different attacks. We are aware of only a few works on the latter [4, 5, 6, 71. Proposing a simple linear collusion attack that consists of adding noise to the average of K independent copies, the authors concluded in [SI that, for n users and fingerprints using N samples, O( -)
independently marked copies are sufficient for an attack to defeat the underlying system with non-negligible probability, when Gaussian watermarks are considered. It was further shown to he optimal: no other wa-0-7803-7965-9/03/$17.00 02003 IEEE termarking scheme can offer better collusion resistanceI51. These results are also supported by [4]. Stone suggested that the most powerful attack may succeed to defeat uniformly distributed watermarks if as few as one to two dozen independent copies are available [7] . In our previous work, we analyzed the collusion resistance of an orthogonal fingerprinting system under different attacks when employing different performance criteria, and derived lower and upper bounds for the maximum number of colluders needed to thwart the system [9] .
Regardless of the superior collusion resistance of orthogonal Gaussian fingerprints over other fingerprinting schemes, previous analysis revealed that attacks based on a few dozen independent copies can confound a fingerprinting system using orthogonal modulation [4, 5.91 . Therefore, an alternative fingerprinting scheme is needed that will exploit a different aspect of the collusion problem in order to achieve improved collusion resistance. To accomplish this, we propose to exploit the fact that adversaries are more likely to collude with some users than others. We propose an alternative fingerprinting scheme which still employs Gaussian watermarks but assigns correlated fingerprints to members of a group of potential colluders while the fingerprints assigned to different groups are independent of each other. Throughout this paper, we consider additive embedding, a general watermarking scheme, where a watermark signal is added to a host signal, and will focus entirely on the averaging form of collusion attack.
THE PROPOSED FINGERPRINTING SCHEME
Fingerprinting systems using orthogonal modulation do not consider the following issues:
I. Orthogonal fingerprinting schemes are designed for the equal possibility of collusion among all users. However, some groups of users are more likely to come together and c q out collusion (i.e. users from the same region, or users sharing the same cultural background).
2.
Orthogonality of fingerprints helps to distinguish individual users. However, this orthogonality also puts innocent users into suspicion with equal probability. It was shown in [9] that when the number of colluders is beyond acertain value, catching one colluder successfully is very likely to require the detection system to suspect all users as guilty 3. The performance can be improved by applying appropriate detection strategies. The challenge is to take advantages of the previous points in designing the detection process.
By considering these issues, we improve on the orthogonal fingerprinting system, and provide a means to enhance the collusion Grouping: the overall fingerprinting system is implemented by designing L sub-systems. For simplicity, we assume that each subsystem can accommodate up to M users. Therefore, the total number of users is n = h. 1 x L. The choice of M is affected by many factors, such as the number of potential purchasers in one region, and the collusion pattem of users. We also assume that fingerprints assigned to different groups are independent of each other. Two main advantages are provided by independency among groups. First, the detection process is simple to carry out, and secondly, when collusion occurs, the independency among groups helps to limit the innocents under suspicion within one group, since the possibility to wrongly accuse another group is negligible. Based on this proposed fingerprinting scheme, we need to address such issues as the size of groups and the coefficient p. The parameters h. 1 and p shall he chosen to yield a good system performance.
I1

DETECTION SCHEME
In this section we discuss the problem of detecting the colluders when the above scheme is considered. As in Fig. 1 , the system accommodates n users, consisting of L groups with M users within each group. When a collusion occurs. suppose that totally K colluders are involved in forming a colluded content copy y. and the number of colluders within group i is k , satisfying xf= k. = K .
The observed content y after the average collusion is where S,i L [I, ..., MI, indicates a subset of size \Sc,\ = k.. and s,j's are Gaussian distributed. We also assume the additive distortion d is an N-dimensional vector following an i.i.d. Gaussian distribution with zero-mean and variance U:. In this model, the number of colluders K and the subsets S, ; ' s are unknown parameters. The non-blind scenario is assumed in our consideration, meaning that the host signal x is available at the detector and thus always subtracted from y for analysis.
The detection scheme consists of two stages. The first stage focuses on identifying groups including colluders. and the second one involves identifying colluders within each "guilty" group. where the set i indicates the indices of groups including colluders. As indicated in the distribution (4), the threshold hc here is determined by the pdf. Since normally the number of groups involving in the collusion is small, we can correctly classify groups with high probability under the non-blind scenario. Stage 2 . Colluder detection within each group: after classifying groups into the colluder-absent class or the colluder-present class, we need to further identify colluders within each group. However, applying (6) to locate colluders is not preferred due lo two concerns. One is that the knowledge of K and k, is usually not available in practice, and needs to be estimated. For the remainder of this paper, however, we assume that the detector knows K and k,. In addition, the above approach aims to minimize the joint estimation error of all colluders, and it lacks of the capability in adjusting parameters to satisfy specific system requirements. Regardless of these concerns, the observation in (6) suggests the use of T,, to detect colluders within each group. Therefore, we employ a simple detection approach by comparing T,i(j) to a threshold hi and indicating a colluder-presence whenever T , i ( j ) is greater than hi.
That is, In our approach, we choose the thresholds such that
where the Q-function is Q(t) = Jtm & e z p ( -z 2 / 2 ) d z , and the values of a , and a 2 depend upon the system requirements.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
The purpose of this section is to show the performance ofthe above system under one of the most popular criteria: the probability of a false negative Pfn (failing to identify any of the colluders) compared to the probability of a false positive PfP (falsely indicating that an innocent user is a colluder). For convenience, we shall use the probability of detection P d = 1 -Pfm in our analysis. The goal of this criteria is to catch at least one colluder with high confidence. We note that other performance criteria might arise under different situations, such as described in Now the threshold h is chaser such that Note that h is a common threshold for mfferent groups. Advantages of the process (I I ) are that components of the vector T,, are independent and that the resulting variance is smaller than U;.
We proceed to evaluate the performance of the above system. Etll Y--X II } = (r+ meaning the overall MSE equals to the fingerprint energy. Therefore, the variance U: is based on {ki} correspondingly. One factor of great concern here is the coefficient p. When the total number of users is small, for instance n. 5 100, all the users will belong lo one or two groups, a situation where Stage 1 is normally unnecessary and thus p should be chosen to maximize the detection probability in Stage 2. We note that the detection performance is characterized by the mean difference (1 -p)IIsII/K as referring to (7). therefore a negative p is preferred. We can see that the difficulty in analyzing the collusion resislance lies in calculating such joint probabilities as p, and 4.. We first show the performance by examples when the total number of users is~small and a negative p = -0.01 is used, as in Fig. 2(a) . It is clear that introducing a negative p helps to improve the performance when n is small. It seems the worst case, in the sense ofperformance, happens when each guilty group contributes equal number ofcolluders, meaning k, = K/lil, for i E i. Fig. 2(b) , we note that this approximation is very accurate, and our scheme is superior to the orthogonal one.
To have an overall understanding of the collusion resistance of the proposed scheme, we further study the maximum resistahle number of colluders K,,, as a function of n. With a given n, M and {k,}'s, the parameters a1 which determines the threshold h c , a 2 which determines the threshold h, and p which affects the probability of group detection, are chosen to maximize P d ( a 1 , u 2 , p ) subject to the constraint Pfp(al,u2,p) 5 e. In reality, the value of p is limited by the quantization precision of the image system. With the fact (at least with our hope) that the size /il should be reasonable, we note that the results are not as sensitive to a, and pas to a2. Therefore, to simplify our searching process, we discrete the values of 011 and p. Also, we consider the performance of the worst case where ki = K/lil, for i E i. We illustrate an example in Fig. 3 , where M = 60 is used since it is proved to be the best supportable user size for the orthogonal scheme. It is noted that K,,, of the proposed scheme (indicated by the dotted and the dashed-dotted lines) is larger than that of the orthogonal scheme (the solid line), when n is large. Overall, the group-based fingerprinting system provides the performance improvement by yielding better collusion-resistance. It is worth mentioning that the performance is fundamentally affected by the collusion pattem. The smaller the number of guilty groups, the better chance the colluders are identified. 
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated how to improve the collusion resistance performance of fingerprinting systems using orthogonal modulations. We proposed a Gaussian fingerprinting system employing grouping and introduced equal correlations into fingerprints for users within the same group. We proposed a two-stage detection scheme and analyzed the collusion resistance of our fingerprinting system to the average attack under the performance criteria represented by PjP and p d . It was demonstrated that the proposed fingerprinting scheme is superior lo orthogonal fingerprints, when the number of guilty groups is nuld. In this work we assumed that the detector knew the number of colluders ki from each group. However, this is typically not known in practice, and in the future we plan to investigate techniques for estimating ki and studying the effect that using estimated k, has upon detection performance.
